LIBKOS, Associated Press
Ukrainian soldiers fire at Russian positions Jan. 9 from a U.S.-supplied M777 howitzer in Kherson region, Ukraine.
WASHINGTON — U.S. lawmakers are sounding the alarm about challenges facing the U.S. defense industrial base as the war in Ukraine strains weapon supplies.
It could take years to replenish certain types of weapons the U.S. sent to Kyiv, with no easy way to ramp up production quickly. That has policymakers deeply concerned about whether the U.S. would be able to field enough weapons if conflict broke out in the Taiwan Strait.
The House Armed Services Committee is scheduled to examine the defense industrial base during its second hearing of the year on Wednesday.
“This ought to be a flashing red light for us, and it’s shocking to me,” said Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, during an event at the American Enterprise Institute in late January. “This is a huge, glaring problem.”
The issue could prove crucial as Congress considers its annual defense policy legislation. After President Joe Biden sends Congress his fiscal 2024 budget in March, the defense committees will begin compiling the mammoth bill, with a House markup expected in the late spring or summer.
“We need to increase that ability to surge when we need it, which means we desperately need to increase our manufacturing base for key weapons systems,” Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, said in a Fox News interview. “It’s a huge priority for our committee to increase that production capacity.”
Pressing shortages
According to a report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the U.S. could run out of critical weapons like long-range, precision-guided munitions less than a week into a possible Taiwan Strait war.
The report stresses that U.S. aid to Ukraine is not the problem in and of itself, since a war in the Indo-Pacific would largely require different types of weapons. But the sheer number of munitions required to sustain Ukraine — where the U.S. is not even actively involved — clarifies how quickly stockpiles could be depleted if another war broke out.
“The war in Ukraine has shown us that our industrial base is not prepared,” said CSIS International Security Program director Seth G. Jones, the report’s author. “It’s not producing the kinds of munitions and materiel we need for a conventional war and for conventional deterrence. So, you know, it’s a wake-up call.”
Part of the problem, Jones said, is that defense contractors cut back on production of certain weapons when there’s less need for them, making it difficult to scale up quickly when demand surges.
It could take seven years to restore U.S. inventories of 155mm precision-guided munitions, eight years to replace Javelin anti-tank missile systems and 18 years to replace Stinger surface-to-air missiles, according to a CSIS analysis of how long it would take at recent production rates to replenish weapon inventories.
If the Defense Department surges production by committing more funding, those timelines speed up significantly — but still linger in the multiyear range, according to that analysis.
“What industry will tell you is that the reason that they don’t have the ability to make as many weapons as we now need is because they don’t want to make that major investment without what they refer to as a demand signal, without knowing that we’re going to buy them,” Smith said. “Predicting future conflict is actually more difficult than it looks. U.S. taxpayers don’t want to spend a ton of money on weapons that we don’t need.”
Congressional efforts
Lawmakers made some policy changes with an eye to defense industrial base issues in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law last December.
The legislation authorized the Pentagon to establish multiyear contracts for certain weapons the U.S. provided to Ukraine.
Multiyear conflicts encourage higher production rates because contractors can count on a stable supply of funding over longer periods of time.
“In the last NDAA, we put specific language in to encourage the production of munitions because we’re using so much — particularly artillery shells,” said Democrat Jack Reed of Rhode Island, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “So we are very, very conscious of our industrial base.”
Defense Department officials maintain they’re aware of the challenges and have been working to address them. During a media roundtable in late January, Douglas Bush, the assistant Army secretary for acquisition, said the Pentagon is working to develop multiyear contracts based on the new authorities Congress provided in the NDAA.
He also said he was confident in the department’s ability to speed up production of critical weapons should war break out in the Indo-Pacific.
“What I have seen from this ramp-up is, I do believe we are capable of ramping up quickly, because we’re doing it right now, and I believe that American industry can and would respond,” Bush said. “I think there are really important policy questions to think through regarding how big the war reserves need to be, how much planning we do for mobilization in advance, and how much resources we’re willing to put against this need.”
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Analysis: Stakes rise as Iran can fuel ‘several’ atom bombs
AP file
For months, U.S. officials balked at sending M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, insisting they were too complicated and too hard to maintain and repair.
On Wednesday, that abruptly changed. Ukraine's desperate pleas for tanks were answered with a sweeping, trans-Atlantic yes.
The dramatic reversal was the culmination of intense international pressure and diplomatic arm-twisting that played out over the last week. And it resulted in in a quick succession of announcements: The U.S. said it will send 31 of the 70-ton Abrams battle tanks to Ukraine, and Germany announced it will send 14 Leopard 2 tanks and allow other countries to do the same.
AP file
For months, U.S. officials balked at sending M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, insisting they were too complicated and too hard to maintain and repair.
On Wednesday, that abruptly changed. Ukraine's desperate pleas for tanks were answered with a sweeping, trans-Atlantic yes.
The dramatic reversal was the culmination of intense international pressure and diplomatic arm-twisting that played out over the last week. And it resulted in in a quick succession of announcements: The U.S. said it will send 31 of the 70-ton Abrams battle tanks to Ukraine, and Germany announced it will send 14 Leopard 2 tanks and allow other countries to do the same.
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Analysis: Stakes rise as Iran can fuel ‘several’ atom bombs
Christian Murdock/The Gazette via AP, File
WHAT ARE THE ABRAMS?
M1 Abrams tanks have led American battle assaults for decades.
Carrying a crew of four, the Abrams was first deployed to war in 1991. It has thick armor, a 120 mm main gun, armor piercing capabilities, advanced targeting systems, thick tracked wheels and a 1,500-horsepower turbine engine with a top speed of about 42 miles per hour (68 kilometers per hour).
Crews interviewed in a 1992 Government Accountability Office review after the Persian Gulf War praised its high survivability and said “several M1A1 crews reported receiving direct frontal hits from Iraqi T-72s with minimal damage.”
More recently, the battle titans led the charge to Baghdad during America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, as 3rd Infantry Division units conducted what was dubbed “Thunder Runs” to break through Iraqi defenses.
The Abrams' powerful jet engine can propel the tank through almost any terrain, whether heavy snow or heavy mud, said Kevin Butler, a former Army lieutenant who served as an Abrams tank platoon leader. Butler recalled a muddy exercise in the late 1990s at Fort Stewart, Georgia, where he’d voiced concern about the tanks getting stuck because it had already stuck the Humvees.
The Abrams, he said, "didn’t even notice” the mud.
Christian Murdock/The Gazette via AP, File
WHAT ARE THE ABRAMS?
M1 Abrams tanks have led American battle assaults for decades.
Carrying a crew of four, the Abrams was first deployed to war in 1991. It has thick armor, a 120 mm main gun, armor piercing capabilities, advanced targeting systems, thick tracked wheels and a 1,500-horsepower turbine engine with a top speed of about 42 miles per hour (68 kilometers per hour).
Crews interviewed in a 1992 Government Accountability Office review after the Persian Gulf War praised its high survivability and said “several M1A1 crews reported receiving direct frontal hits from Iraqi T-72s with minimal damage.”
More recently, the battle titans led the charge to Baghdad during America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, as 3rd Infantry Division units conducted what was dubbed “Thunder Runs” to break through Iraqi defenses.
The Abrams' powerful jet engine can propel the tank through almost any terrain, whether heavy snow or heavy mud, said Kevin Butler, a former Army lieutenant who served as an Abrams tank platoon leader. Butler recalled a muddy exercise in the late 1990s at Fort Stewart, Georgia, where he’d voiced concern about the tanks getting stuck because it had already stuck the Humvees.
The Abrams, he said, "didn’t even notice” the mud.
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Analysis: Stakes rise as Iran can fuel ‘several’ atom bombs
AP file
WHY THE U.S. KEPT SAYING NO
The Abrams' jet engine needs hundreds of gallons of fuel to operate.
It will burn through fuel at a rate of at least two gallons per mile (4.7 liters per kilometer), whether the tank is moving or idling, Butler said, which means a constant supply convoy of fuel trucks must stay within reach so it can keep moving forward.
The U.S. worried that the fuel demands would create a logistical nightmare for Ukrainian forces. While an Abrams can storm through the snow and mud, fuel trucks can't. In addition, like any jet engine, the Abrams' turbine needs air to breathe, which it sucks in through filtered rear vents. When those vent filters get clogged — whether by sand, as soldiers reported to GAO in 1992, or by debris they might encounter in Ukraine — they can't perform.
“The Abrams tank is a very complicated piece of equipment. It’s expensive, it’s hard to train on. ... It is not the easiest system to maintain. It may or may not be the right system,” The under secretary of defense for policy, Colin Kahl, told reporters last week at the Pentagon.
The Abrams also will require months of training. Ukrainian forces will have to learn how to operate its more complex systems, and how to keep it running and fueled.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, pictured
AP file
WHY THE U.S. KEPT SAYING NO
The Abrams' jet engine needs hundreds of gallons of fuel to operate.
It will burn through fuel at a rate of at least two gallons per mile (4.7 liters per kilometer), whether the tank is moving or idling, Butler said, which means a constant supply convoy of fuel trucks must stay within reach so it can keep moving forward.
The U.S. worried that the fuel demands would create a logistical nightmare for Ukrainian forces. While an Abrams can storm through the snow and mud, fuel trucks can't. In addition, like any jet engine, the Abrams' turbine needs air to breathe, which it sucks in through filtered rear vents. When those vent filters get clogged — whether by sand, as soldiers reported to GAO in 1992, or by debris they might encounter in Ukraine — they can't perform.
“The Abrams tank is a very complicated piece of equipment. It’s expensive, it’s hard to train on. ... It is not the easiest system to maintain. It may or may not be the right system,” The under secretary of defense for policy, Colin Kahl, told reporters last week at the Pentagon.
The Abrams also will require months of training. Ukrainian forces will have to learn how to operate its more complex systems, and how to keep it running and fueled.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, pictured
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Analysis: Stakes rise as Iran can fuel ‘several’ atom bombs
Ronen Zvulun/Pool Photo via AP
THE ARM-TWISTING TURNABOUT
Despite all the drawbacks expressed by the U.S., when all was said and done, it came down to political realities and a diplomatic dance.
Germany had been reluctant to send the Leopards, or allow allies to send them, unless the U.S. put its Abrams on the table, due to concerns that supplying the tanks would incur Russia’s wrath. The U.S., meanwhile, argued that the German-made Leopards were a better fit because Ukrainian troops could get them and get trained on them far more quickly and easily.
The impasse frustrated European allies, such as Poland, who wanted to send Leopards but couldn’t without Germany’s OK. Thus began the more fierce negotiations.
U.S. and German officials both used the word “intensive” to describe the talks that ultimately led to the tank turnabout by both countries.
“This is the result of intensive consultations, once again, with our allies and international partners,” Chancellor Olaf Scholz, pictured, said in an address to German lawmakers on Wednesday.
Echoing Scholz, a senior U.S. administration official said talks had been going on for some time but “in a much more intensified way over the last number of weeks.” The official spoke on condition of anonymity to provide details on the decision.
From President Joe Biden on down, calls were made, including to Scholz. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke and met with their German counterparts and other allies.
Last Friday, the pressure was palpable. Top defense leaders from more than 50 countries met at Ramstein Air Base in Germany to discuss Ukraine's ongoing weapons and equipment needs. Tanks were a key subject. Leaders from countries that have Leopard tanks met with the new German defense minister.
Gradually, the German stance began to publicly soften, leading to Wednesday's announcements. Asked repeatedly what changed, Biden administration officials sidestepped. Asked directly about German pressure, Biden told reporters, “Germany didn’t force me to change our mind.”
Ronen Zvulun/Pool Photo via AP
THE ARM-TWISTING TURNABOUT
Despite all the drawbacks expressed by the U.S., when all was said and done, it came down to political realities and a diplomatic dance.
Germany had been reluctant to send the Leopards, or allow allies to send them, unless the U.S. put its Abrams on the table, due to concerns that supplying the tanks would incur Russia’s wrath. The U.S., meanwhile, argued that the German-made Leopards were a better fit because Ukrainian troops could get them and get trained on them far more quickly and easily.
The impasse frustrated European allies, such as Poland, who wanted to send Leopards but couldn’t without Germany’s OK. Thus began the more fierce negotiations.
U.S. and German officials both used the word “intensive” to describe the talks that ultimately led to the tank turnabout by both countries.
“This is the result of intensive consultations, once again, with our allies and international partners,” Chancellor Olaf Scholz, pictured, said in an address to German lawmakers on Wednesday.
Echoing Scholz, a senior U.S. administration official said talks had been going on for some time but “in a much more intensified way over the last number of weeks.” The official spoke on condition of anonymity to provide details on the decision.
From President Joe Biden on down, calls were made, including to Scholz. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke and met with their German counterparts and other allies.
Last Friday, the pressure was palpable. Top defense leaders from more than 50 countries met at Ramstein Air Base in Germany to discuss Ukraine's ongoing weapons and equipment needs. Tanks were a key subject. Leaders from countries that have Leopard tanks met with the new German defense minister.
Gradually, the German stance began to publicly soften, leading to Wednesday's announcements. Asked repeatedly what changed, Biden administration officials sidestepped. Asked directly about German pressure, Biden told reporters, “Germany didn’t force me to change our mind.”
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Analysis: Stakes rise as Iran can fuel ‘several’ atom bombs
AP Photo/LIBKOS, File
HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE?
Timing for both delivery of the tanks to Ukraine and the training of Ukrainian troops is fuzzy. U.S. officials would only say that it will take “many months” to deliver the Abrams tanks, but that the Leopards will arrive faster.
Doug Bush, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, said the U.S. no longer buys new Abrams, but uses older ones as “seed vehicles” and refurbishes them. Doing that, however, isn't quick or easy, he said.
The training can begin more quickly, and the Pentagon is developing a program.
“We want to make sure that they (the tanks) fall on ready hands, and that the Ukrainians know how to use them, they know how to keep them running, and they’ve got the supply chain in place for spare parts and supplies," said National Security Council spokesman John Kirby.
Bush said the Ukrainians have shown they have the knowledge and capabilities to learn new systems quickly.
“We can often abbreviate and accelerate what we can do in terms of training for Ukrainian army soldiers,” he told reporters Wednesday. "With enough motivation and dedicated 24/7 access to them, we can train people really quickly,” he said. "The U.S. Army knows how to do that.”
AP Photo/LIBKOS, File
HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE?
Timing for both delivery of the tanks to Ukraine and the training of Ukrainian troops is fuzzy. U.S. officials would only say that it will take “many months” to deliver the Abrams tanks, but that the Leopards will arrive faster.
Doug Bush, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, said the U.S. no longer buys new Abrams, but uses older ones as “seed vehicles” and refurbishes them. Doing that, however, isn't quick or easy, he said.
The training can begin more quickly, and the Pentagon is developing a program.
“We want to make sure that they (the tanks) fall on ready hands, and that the Ukrainians know how to use them, they know how to keep them running, and they’ve got the supply chain in place for spare parts and supplies," said National Security Council spokesman John Kirby.
Bush said the Ukrainians have shown they have the knowledge and capabilities to learn new systems quickly.
“We can often abbreviate and accelerate what we can do in terms of training for Ukrainian army soldiers,” he told reporters Wednesday. "With enough motivation and dedicated 24/7 access to them, we can train people really quickly,” he said. "The U.S. Army knows how to do that.”
